<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4917388106434755335</id><updated>2011-04-21T21:19:09.950-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Investment Capital Inform</title><subtitle type='html'></subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://investmentcapitalinform.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/4917388106434755335/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://investmentcapitalinform.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>investmentcapitalinform</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/13167244771085319291</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>1</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4917388106434755335.post-2133362712675543380</id><published>2008-04-04T02:24:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-09T09:30:22.997-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Entrepreneurial Finance: The Owner's Perspective</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;There are both stark  and subtle differences, both in theory and in practice, between  entrepreneurial finance as practiced in higher-potential small firms and  corporate or administrative finance, which usually occurs in larger publicly  traded companies. Students and practitioners of entrepreneurial finance have  always been dubious about the reliabil­ity and relevance of much of so-called  modern finance theory.2 High-potential small businesses need to  focus their attention on key aspects of financial management. Consider the  following:&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Cash flow and cash. &lt;/strong&gt;Cash flow and cash are king and  queen in entrepreneurial finance. Accrual-based accounting, earnings per share,  or creative and aggressive use of the tax codes and rules of the Securities and  Exchange Commission are not.&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Time and timing. &lt;/strong&gt;Financing  alternatives for the financial health of an enterprise are often more sensitive  to, or vulnerable to, the time dimension. In entrepreneurial ventures, critical  financing moves often have a shorter and more compressed time period, have a  more rapidly changing optimum timing, and are subject to wider, more volatile  swings from lows to highs and back.&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Capital markets. &lt;/strong&gt;Capital markets for  over 95 percent of growth financing for private entrepreneurial ventures are  relatively imper­fect, in that they are frequently inaccessible, unorganized,  and often invisible. Virtually all the underlying characteristics and  assumptions that dominate popular financial theories and models (such as the  cap­ital asset pricing model) simply do not apply, even up to the point of a  public offering for a small company. In reality, there are so many and such significant  information, knowledge, and market gaps and asymmetries that the rational,  perfect market models suffer enor­mous limitations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Exhibit  4.3 Initial Losses by Small New  Ventures&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Source: Special appreciation is due to Bert  Twaalfhoven, founder and chairman of Indivers, the Dutch firm that compiled  this summary and that owns the firm on which the chart is based. Mr.  Twaalfhoven was also a leader in the Class of 1954 at Harvard Business School  and has been active in supporting the Entrepreneurial Management Interest Group  and research efforts there.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Emphasis. &lt;/strong&gt;While capital is one of the  least important factors in the successful growth of higher-potential ventures,  it is often a stum­bling block for small businesses not used to finding  resources for growth. When considering outside investors, you must seek not  only the best deal but also the backer who will provide the most value in terms  of know-how, wisdom, counsel, and help. Opt for the value added (beyond money),  rather than just the best deal or share price (see also about &lt;a href="http://www.cogproject.org/" title="where to invest"&gt;where to invest&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Strategies for raising capital. &lt;/strong&gt;Strategies that  optimize or maxi­mize the amount of money raised can actually serve to increase  risk in emerging companies, rather than lower it. Thus, the concept of "staged capital  commitments," whereby money is invested for a three- to eighteen-month  phase and is followed by subsequent com­mitments based on results and promise,  is a prevalent practice among venture capitalists and other investors in  higher-potential ventures. Similarly, wise entrepreneurs may refuse excess  capital when the val­uation is less attractive and when they believe that  valuation will rise substantially.&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Downside  consequences. &lt;/strong&gt;Consequences of financial strategies and decisions are eminently more  personal and emotional for the owners than for the management of large  companies. The downside conse­quences for such entrepreneurs of running out of  cash or failing are monumental and relatively catastrophic, since personal  guarantees of bank or other loans are common.&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Risk-reward relationships. &lt;/strong&gt;While the  high-risk-high-reward and low-risk-low-reward relationship (a so-called law of  economics and finance) works fairly well in efficient, mature, and relatively  perfect capital markets (e.g., those with money market accounts, deposits in  savings and loan institutions, widely held and traded stocks and bonds, and  certificates of deposit), just the opposite occurs too reg­ularly in  entrepreneurial finance to permit much comfort with this law. Time and again,  some of the most profitable, highest-return ven­ture investments have been  quite low-risk propositions from the out­set. Yet the way the capital markets  price these deals is just the reverse. The reasons are anchored in the second  and third points noted above - timing and the asymmetries and imperfections of  the capital markets for deals. Entrepreneurs or investors who create or  recognize lower-risk, very-high-yield business propositions, before others jump  on the Brink's truck, will defy the laws of economics and finance. By proving  your business model and articulating growth strategies, you provide an exciting  low-risk, high-return scenario (see also about &lt;a href="http://www.invest-suggest.com/" title="investor"&gt;investor&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Valuation methods. &lt;/strong&gt;Established company valuation  methods, such as those based on discounted cash flow models used in Wall Street  megadeals, seem to favor the seller, rather than the buyer, of private emerging  entrepreneurial companies. A seller loves to see a recent MBA or investment banking firm alumnus show up with an HP cal­culator or the latest laptop  personal computer and then proceed to develop "the ten-year discounted  cash flow stream." The assumptions normally made  and the mind-set behind them are irrelevant or grossly misleading for valuation  of smaller private firms because of dynamic and erratic historical and  prospective growth curves (see also about &lt;a href="http://www.invest-of-money.com/" title="established business network"&gt;established business network&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Conventional financial ratios. &lt;/strong&gt;Current financial  ratios are mis­leading when applied to most private entrepreneurial companies.  For one thing, entrepreneurs often own more than one company at once and move  cash and assets from one to another. For example, an entre­preneur may own real  estate and equipment in one entity and lease k to another company. Using  different fiscal years compounds the difficulty of interpreting what the  balance sheet really means and the possibilities for aggressive tax avoidance.  Further, many of the most important value and equity builders in the business  are off the bal­ance sheet or are hidden assets: the excellent management team;  the best scientist, technician, or designer; know-how and business rela­tionships  that cannot be bought or sold, let alone valued for the bal­ance sheet (see also about &lt;a href="http://www.my-investment.com/" title="return on investment"&gt;return on investment&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;•&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;strong&gt;Goals. &lt;/strong&gt;Creating value over the long term, rather than  maximizing quarterly earnings, is a prevalent mind-set and strategy among  highly successful entrepreneurs. Since profit is more than just the bottom  line, financial strategies are geared to build value, often at the expense of  short-term earnings. The growth required to build value often is heavily  self-financed, thereby eroding possible accounting earnings.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Determining  Capital Requirements&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;How much money does  my venture need? When is it needed? How long will it last? Where and from whom  can it be raised? How should this process be orchestrated and managed? The next  two sections provide answers to the vital questions entrepreneurs should ask at  any stage in the development of a company.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Financial  Strategy Framework&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The financial  strategy framework shown in Exhibit 4.4 is a way to begin crafting financial  and fund-raising strategies. The exhibit provides a flow and logic with which  an otherwise confusing, if not befuddling, task can each source has  particular requirements and costs - both apparent and hidden - that carry  implications for both financial strategy and finan­cial requirements. The  premise is that successful entrepreneurs are aware of potentially punishing  situations, and that they are careful to "sweat the details" and  proceed with a certain degree of wariness as they evaluate, select, negotiate,  and craft business relationships with poten­tial funding sources. In doing so,  they are more likely to find the right sources, at the right time, and on the  right terms and conditions. They are also more likely to avoid potential  mismatches, costly sidetracking for the wrong sources, and the disastrous  marriage to these sources that might follow.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Defuses of strategic freedom:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Time to 00C Time to close Future alternatives  Risk/reward Personal concern&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Sources and structure&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Equity Other&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Financial requirements&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Driven by:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Burn rate Operating needs Working capital Asset  requirements and sales&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Business&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Marketing Operations Finance&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Value creation&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source: This framework was developed for the Financing  Entrepreneurial Ventures course at Babson College and has been used in the  Entrepreneurial Finance course at the Harvard Business School.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Certain  changes in the financial climate, such as the aftershocks felt after the  stock-market crashes of October 1987 and March 2000, can cause repercussions  across financial markets and institutions serving smaller companies. These take  the form of greater caution by lenders and investors alike as they seek to  increase their protection against risk. When the financial climate becomes  harsher, an entrepreneur's capac­ity to devise financing strategies and to  effectively deal with financing sources can be stretched to the limit and  beyond. But it is exactly at a time like this that existing companies have a  capital-markets advantage. Billions of risk-averse dollars retreat to the  sidelines in angst. They can't make a return on the sideline but are too afraid  to invest, unless they find an existing company with a reasonable track record  and a desire to grow.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/4917388106434755335-2133362712675543380?l=investmentcapitalinform.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://investmentcapitalinform.blogspot.com/feeds/2133362712675543380/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=4917388106434755335&amp;postID=2133362712675543380' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/4917388106434755335/posts/default/2133362712675543380'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/4917388106434755335/posts/default/2133362712675543380'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://investmentcapitalinform.blogspot.com/2008/04/entrepreneurial-finance-owners.html' title='Entrepreneurial Finance: The Owner&apos;s Perspective'/><author><name>investmentcapitalinform</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/13167244771085319291</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry></feed>
